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The Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against
Penal Interest is not Firmly Rooted in Pennsylvania
Law, Making the Use of Extrajudicial Statements
Made by a Non-Testifying Accomplice A Violation of
the Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to
Confront Witnesses: Commonwealth v. Robins
CRIMINAL LAW - TRIAL - HEARSAY EVIDENCE - STATEMENTS BY
CONSPIRATORS - RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO CONFRONT
WITNESSES - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the ad-
mission into evidence of extrajudicial statements made by a non-
testifying accomplice violated the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.
Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d 514 (Pa. 2002).
In June 1995, a burglary occurred at Coins and Computers, a
collectibles store located in Dormont, PA.' Based on a tip placing
a white van in front of the store near the time of the burglary, the
police canvassed local car rental agencies, making inquiries into
recently rented vans.2  Because of the interviews, the police
learned that John Wayne Robins had recently rented white vans
on two separate occasions.3 Based on the information gleaned
from one interview, the police obtained a search warrant for Rob-
ins' home.4 Although denying any involvement in the burglary,
Robins confirmed renting the two vans, claiming he did so for a
1. Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. 2002). Approximately $500,000
worth of goods was taken from the store's safe. Id.
2. Id. After a news report of the burglary, a citizen told the police that he saw "at
least two men carrying items to a white van parked in front of the shop during the probable
time of the incident." Id.
3. Id. The police received this information from a local Rent-A-Wreck employee. Id.
The employee told police that Robins had first rented a white van five days before the bur-
glary. Id. He also said that Robins returned that van three days later (two days before the
burglary), expressing dissatisfaction with the number of side windows on the van. Id.
Robins then rented a second white van which had no windows on the side panels. Id.
4. Id. At Robins' home, the police found various locksmithing tools and manuals and a
police scanner, all legally in Robins' possession. Id.
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friend, Barry Auman, who needed a van to move certain personal
items.'
Approximately one year after the burglary, Joseph Downey, an
inmate at the Allegheny County Jail, identified Auman as one of
the perpetrators of the Coins and Computers burglary.' In ex-
change for his release, Downey agreed to participate in a sting
operation against Auman.7 After both Downey and Auman were
released from jail, Downey arranged a meeting in a hotel room
between Auman and a purported buyer of Auman's stamps in
June of 1996.8 Prior to the meeting, the police equipped the hotel
room with recording equipment and placed a hidden microphone
on Downey. While en route to the rendezvous, Auman told
Downey that he was under the influence of a narcotic, having just
recently injected himself." Once in the room, Auman, acting to
confirm his possession of the stamps, discussed various details of
the burglary." Without mentioning Robins by name, Auman did
mention that a friend had rented the van used in the burglary
from Rent-A-Wreck. 2 No exchange of money or stamps occurred
during the meeting, but Auman did promise to make the stamps
available for the buyer's perusal before finalizing the sale. 3 Be-
fore consummating the sale, however, Auman phoned the prospec-
5. Id. Robins stated that Auman, lacking a valid driver's license, could not rent the
van on his own. Id.
6. Robins, 812 A.2d at 516. In May 1996, Auman was incarcerated for driving under
the influence, and he and Downey shared the same cellblock. Id. During their confine-
ment, Downey claimed that Auman admitted responsibility for the Coins and Computers
burglary. Id. Downey also said that although Auman did not directly implicate others,
Auman did relate details that indirectly implicated a confederate. Id. at 516-17. Among
the various details Auman apparently told Downey were "references to a partner who was a
locksmith, rented the van, lived in [the] South Side, and had a pool in his backyard." Id. at
517. Auman also purportedly stated that he still had $250,000 worth of stamps taken from
the burglary. Id.
7. Id. at 517.




11. Robins, 812 A.2d at 517. Despite acquiescing to repeated requests for more detail
by Downey and the undercover detective, Auman occasionally expressed concern that in
relaying the details of the incident he was implicating himself in the burglary. Id. In fact,
Auman went so far as to ask whether the conversation was being recorded. Id. at 517 n.4.
Auman also expressed some hesitancy at proffering pictures of the stolen stamps and noted
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tive buyer, telling him that the stamps were no longer available. 4
Following this conversation, the police arrested Auman and then
arrested Robins. 5
Although Auman and Robins were originally scheduled for a
joint trial, Auman pled guilty before the trial commenced, leaving
only the conspiracy to commit burglary charge against Robins."5
Prior to trial, Robins filed a motion, arguing that both Auman's
jailhouse declaration and his hotel room statements were inad-
missible hearsay. 7 Moreover, Robins contended that Auman's
statements fell outside the coconspirator exception to the hearsay
evidence rule. 8  The Commonwealth countered that Auman's
statements were, in fact, admissible under the coconspirator ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. 9 The Commonwealth also contended
that Auman's statements were admissible over hearsay and Con-
frontation Clause challenges because they were declarations
against Auman's own penal interest. ° While the trial judge re-
jected the coconspirator exception to hearsay evidence, 2 he did
accept the Commonwealth's "against penal interest" theory.2 As a
14. Id. Auman claimed that he could not locate the stamps. Id.
15. Id.
16. Robins, 812 A.2d at 517. As a result of the guilty plea, Auman was convicted and
sentenced for burglary and related offenses. Id.
17. Id. at 518. Robins argued that Auman's "statements were inadmissible as hearsay
and challenged any assertion by the Commonwealth that they qualified for admission pur-
suant to the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule." Id. As defined by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, "hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted." FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
18. Id. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, "a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is not hearsay. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E).
19. Id. The Commonwealth argued that since some of the statements were directed at
the sale of stolen goods, these statements were intended to further an ongoing conspiracy.
Id.
20. Id. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a statement against penal interest made
by an unavailable witness is not to be excluded by the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3). In relevant part, 804(b)(3) reads as follows:
A statement which was at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the de-
clarant to civil or criminal liability... that a reasonable person in the declarant's po-
sition would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the ac-
cused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trust-
worthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
21. Robins, 812 A.2d at 518. The trial court held that the Commonwealth failed to
establish an ongoing conspiracy, since the burglary occurred more than a year ago. Id.
22. Id. In support of admittance, the trial court cited Bruton v. United States, which,
under certain circumstances, permitted redacted statements made by a non-testifying
coconspirator in a joint trial. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), cert. denied,
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result, the trial court allowed Downey to testify regarding
Auman's jaihouse statements, but prohibited Downey from testify-
ing to Auman's statements implicating Robins, either directly or
indirectly.23 Regarding the recorded hotel room statements, the
court permitted the jury to hear a redacted version of the re-
cording.24
At the conclusion of the jury trial, Robins was convicted.25 Rob-
ins appealed, contending that the inclusion of Auman's statements
violated his right to cross-examine the witness as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Arti-
cle 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.26 On appeal, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Robins' conviction in a
memorandum decision.27 Having initially granted allocatur, 8 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case back to the
Superior Court to determine whether Auman's inculpatory state-
ments offended Robins' right to cross-examine witnesses against
him.29
The Superior Court reaffirmed Robins' conviction on remand.0
Despite accepting Robins' position that Auman's "against penal
interest" statements did not fit within a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay rule, the Superior Court found that the trial court's
397 U.S. 1014 (1970). Although accepting the Commonwealth's proposition, the trial court
limited the admissible statements to declarations that directly implicated Auman. Id.
Because Auman's statements incriminating Robins were not sufficiently adverse to
Auman's penal interests, the court precluded those statements. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 517. Like Downey's testimony, statements tending to incriminate Robins
were erased from the tape. Id.
25. Id. at 519. Robins was sentenced to five to ten years of incarceration and restitu-
tion of $220,000. Id.
26. Robins, 812 A.2d at 519. In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right..
• to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The relevant
portion of Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads as follows: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... " PA. CONST. art. I, §9.
27. Robins, 812 A.2d at 519. A memorandum decision is one in which the court "gives
the ruling (what it decides and orders done), but no opinion (reasons for the decision)."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed. 2000).
28. Robins, 812 A.2d at 519. In Pennsylvania, allocatur is a word used "to denote per-
mission to appeal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (7th ed. 2000).
29. Robins, 812 A.2d at 519 (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999)). Accord-
ing to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Lilly stood for the proposition that "certain incul-
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careful redactions provided Robins ample Sixth Amendment pro-
tection."'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again granted allocatur to
determine whether, as declarations against penal interest,
Auman's statements manifested sufficient indicia of reliability to
obviate Sixth Amendment concerns.32 In an opinion authored by
Justice Cappy,33 the majority found Auman's statements lacked
the required markers of credibility to overcome a Sixth Amend-
ment challenge. 34
The court began its exegetical inquiry with a brief summary of
the parties' opposing contentions. 35 According to Robins, Auman's
statements against his penal interest did not qualify as a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule as established by the United
States Supreme Court in Lilly v. Virginia.36  Moreover, because
Auman's jailhouse statements to Downey were little more than
the jailhouse braggadacio common among criminals, they failed to
demonstrate the kind of independent reliability necessary to cir-
cumvent the Sixth Amendment. 37 Robins also contended that the
government involvement in procuring the hotel room statements
further undermined the trustworthiness of Auman's statements,
since the government's goal was not to elicit truthful information
but only to encourage an expedient delineation of events.38 Last,
Robins also argued that Auman's narcotic fugue necessarily de-
tracted from the inherent credibility of his statements.39
In contrast, the Commonwealth argued that the non-custodial
setting of Auman's statements, and the fact that Auman made the
declarations to someone he thought he could trust, effectively dis-
31. Robins, 812 A.2d. at 519. The Superior Court distinguished this case from Lilly,
since the declarations at issue in Lilly were unredacted. Id. As such, the Superior Court
found redaction to be "an appropriate method of safeguarding a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights while maintaining the necessities of the case." Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
Robins, 752 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
32. Id. at 516. As framed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the issue was "whether
the trial court properly overruled Appellant's Sixth Amendment objection to the admission
of non-custodial, extrajudicial statements of a non-testifying accomplice based upon the
position that, as declarations against penal interest, the statements were sufficiently reli-
able to satisfy Confrontation Clause mandates." Id. See supra note 20.
33. Id. Chief Justice Zappala and Justice Nigro joined in Justice Cappy's opinion. Id.
34. Id. at 527.
35. Id. at 520.





tinguished these facts from Lilly.4" Alternatively, the Common-
wealth argued that self-inculpatory, non-custodial, extrajudicial
statements should qualify as a firmly rooted exception to the hear-
say rule.4 And should such statements not qualify as firmly
rooted, the Commonwealth alternatively claimed that the circum-
stances attending Auman's statements evidenced the kind of reli-
able indicia necessary to ameliorate Sixth Amendment concerns.4 2
Regarding Auman's narcotic injection, the Commonwealth de-
ferred to the trial court's rejection of the argument.43
Having summarized the competing contentions, the court
turned to a brief explication of Confrontation Clause mandates.44
Based on established Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the ma-
jority noted that the Confrontation Clause exhibits a strong pref-
erence for cross-examination, because direct, adversarial confron-
tation enhances evidentiary credibility.45 In addition, the court
found that the Confrontation Clause aimed at eliminating the po-
tentially noxious effects of collateral prejudice.46
The majority next analyzed the efficacy of limiting jury instruc-
tions and redacting confessions as anodynes to Confrontation
Clause concerns.47 Although in Bruton the United States Supreme
Court declared that a limiting instruction to the jury was insuffi-
cient to prevent collateral prejudice in a joint trial,48 the court rec-
ognized that the United States Supreme Court had subsequently
restricted the reach of Bruton.49 Still, the court distinguished its
40. Id.
41. Robins, 812 A.2d at 520. The Commonwealth conceded that non-self-inculpatory,




45. Id. "The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context
of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Id. (citing Lilly, 527 U.S. at 123-24
(quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990))).
46. Robins, 812 A.2d at 521. For the court, this is prejudice that might "occur at a joint
trial from a limited admission of incriminatory statements through an extrajudicial confes-
sion of a non-testifying codefendant." Id. (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123).
47. Id. Both the trial court and the superior court's reliance on such redactions
prompted this line of inquiry by the court. Id. See supra note 30.
48. Id. at n.9 (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36).
49. Id. (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). In Marsh, the Court, per
Justice Scalia, held that "the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a
non-testifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his
or her existence." Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211.
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case from both Bruton" and Marsh,51 determining that those cases
were limited to minimizing spillover prejudice in a joint trial,
while Robins involved the trial of a single defendant." Thus, the
majority concluded that Robins was analytically distinct from
Bruton and Marsh, and therefore redaction and limiting instruc-
tions were inapposite.53 As a result, the majority ruled that the
Superior Court erred in finding that Auman's redacted statements
overcame Robins' Sixth Amendment objections, since redaction
was only apropos in the context of a joint trial.54
Having abjured redaction as a panacea for Auman's statements,
Justice Cappy focused his inquiry on another line of Confrontation
Clause cases.55 This line of cases recognized two well-established
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause: the rule of necessity and
sufficient indicia of reliability. 6 Since neither Robins nor the
Commonwealth pursued the question of availability at trial, the
court determined that the issue of unavailability was not within
its scope of appellate review." With availability a non-issue, the
court directed its attention to the question of whether Auman's
statements manifested sufficient indicia of reliability to circum-
vent a Confrontation Clause challenge.58 According to the major-
ity, for a statement to be supported by sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity, the statement must either qualify as a firmly rooted exception
to the hearsay rule or evidence specific guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.59 Given this, the court concluded that the remaining perti-
50. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
51. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
52. Robins, 812 A.2d at 521.
53. Id. Regarding this point, the court stated: "This situation is not one where the
spillover prejudice from a non-testifying codefendant's confession can be cured by a Bruton
redaction." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 522. For the court, Ohio v. Roberts and Lilly v. Virginia exemplified a more
appropriate line of cases. Id. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) and Lilly v. Virginia,
527 U.S. 116 (1999).
56. Id. at 522. In general terms, the court defined the rule of necessity as "requiring
... a demonstration of unavailability of a witness whose statement the government seeks
to admit." Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). The court went on to say that al-
though unavailability is not mandated by the Confrontation Clause, "a demonstration is
necessary where unavailability is an essential component of an underlying hearsay excep-
tion invoked by the government in an effort to surmount a Sixth Amendment challenge. Id.
(citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 406 (1986)).
57. Robins, 812 A.2d. at 518 n.5.
58. Id. at 522. Based on federal precedent, the majority concluded "that certain hear-
say statements marked with sufficient indicia of reliability may be admitted despite the
absence of the witness from trial over Sixth Amendment challenge." Id. (citing Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66 and Lilly, 527 U.S. at 136).
59. Id. (citing Marsh, 448 U.S. at 66 and Lilly, 527 U.S. at 136).
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nent constitutional question was whether Auman's statements
against his penal interest qualified as a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception or whether his statements evidenced sufficient indicia of
reliability.' °
Because questions of firm rooting are a matter of federal law,
the court's analysis followed federal jurisprudence.61 Accordingly,
the majority concluded that "[a] firmly rooted hearsay exception
... is one that does not require corroboration to support its reli-
ability as a prerequisite to admission." 2 Having determined what
constitutes firm rooting under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,
the court examined whether statements against penal interest
qualified as a firmly rooted exception to hearsay evidence.' While
acknowledging that Pennsylvania law had permitted a limited
exception for exculpatory statements, the majority noted that it
still required such statements to be buttressed by adequate assur-
ance of reliability.' Similarly, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
permit the introduction of declarations against penal interest, but
only when such statements are further corroborated by evidence
outside the statements themselves.' Moreover, the majority de-
termined that even when applicable at the federal level, state-
ments against penal interest still require some form of external
corroboration." Based on the confluence of state law, rules of evi-
dence, and federal law, the court concluded that "the hearsay ex-
ception for declarations against penal interest [is] not firmly
rooted under Pennsylvania law. "67
Having rejected Auman's declarations against penal interest as
firmly rooted, Justice Cappy took up the question of whether
Auman's statements manifested sufficient indicia of reliability to
qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule.8 To determine this,
60. Id.
61. Id. at 524.
62. Robins, 812 A.2d at 524 (citing Marsh, 448 U.S. at 66).
63. Id. Unlike the question of firm rooting, however, the majority determined that
state law governed whether Auman's statements qualified as declarations against penal
interest. Id.
64. Id. at 525.
65. Id. According to the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, statements against interest
"are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness." PA. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3). Importantly, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence require "corroborating cir-
cumstantial evidence of trustworthiness before an assertion against the declarant's penal
interest can be introduced by either side in a criminal case." PA. R. EVID. 803(b)(3).
66. Id. at 525. See supra note 20.




Justice Cappy used a totality of the circumstances test, balancing
the contextual reliability of Auman's statements against the Con-
frontation Clause's preference for adversarial testing.69 To begin,
the majority found that the temporal lag between the burglary
and Robins' statements undermined their reliability, since Robins
had ample time for reflection.7" Moreover, although the lack of
relationship between Robins and Auman might tend to support
the reliability of the statements, the fact that the initial conversa-
tion occurred in a cellblock militated against such reliability,
since, as the court concluded, such jailhouse confessions are
equally likely the result of bragging among criminals.71
Regarding Robins' statements in the hotel room, the majority
determined that these statements fell below the requisite level of
reliability to skirt the prophylactic proscriptions of the Confronta-
tion Clause.72 Of particular importance, the court reasoned that
because the arrangement purported to be a prelude to the sale of
stolen stamps, Robins had to continue his prevarication in order to
save face.73 What's more, Justice Cappy claimed that despite his
previous assertions to the contrary, Robins never in fact produced
the stolen goods nor authenticated his possession of them in any
meaningful way.74 The court also concluded that while self-
inculpatory statements which do not shift blame to another might
be sufficiently reliable in a custodial setting, similar statements
made in a non-custodial setting in which the declarant is trying to
69. Id. at 525-26. Lacking a bright-line test, the court enumerated the following list of
factors to be considered:
[Tihe circumstances under which the statements were uttered, including the custo-
dial/non-custodial aspect of the setting and the identity of the listener; the content of
the statement, including whether the statements minimize the responsibility of the
declarant or spread or shift the blame; other possible motivations of the declarant,
including improper motives such as to lie, curry favor, or distort the truth; the nature
and degree of the 'against interest' aspect of the statements, including the extent to
which the declarant apprehends that the making of the statement is likely to actually
subject him to criminal liability; the circumstances or events that prompted the
statements, including whether they were made with the encouragement or at the re-
quest of a listener; the timing of the statements in relation to events described; the
declarant's relationship to the defendant; and any other factors bearing upon the re-
liability of the statement as issue.
Id.
70. Id. at 526.
71. Id. at 526-27.





enhance his image would generally lead to the opposite conclu-
sion."
Justice Saylor concurred in the judgment, agreeing in total with
the majority's determination that declarations against penal in-
terest do not qualify as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule under Pennsylvania law."' Although Justice Saylor also
agreed that Auman's statements failed to evince the requisite de-
gree of reliability needed to obviate Confrontation Clause con-
cerns, he disagreed with the majority's analysis.77 Unlike the ma-
jority, Justice Saylor concluded that Auman's guilty plea alone
sufficiently guaranteed the veracity of Auman's hearsay state-
ments." Moreover, Justice Saylor found the trial court's judicious
redaction of Auman's statements, expunging as they did all in-
criminating references to Robins, sufficiently ameliorative to with-
stand Confrontation Clause objections.79 Still, because the Com-
monwealth sought to use Auman's statements as the functional
equivalent of a witness against Robins, Justice Saylor found that
the Sixth Amendment's preference for face-to-face cross-
examination impeded their admission.0
Justice Saylor next discussed the circumstances surrounding
Robins' statements.81 In general, Justice Saylor agreed with the
majority's use of the totality of the circumstances test,82 but he
concluded that Downey's identity as a confidant and the detec-
tive's role as a prospective purchaser tended to authenticate
Auman's statements.83 Moreover, in contrast to the majority, Jus-
tice Saylor found Lilly inapplicable to non-custodial confessions or
confessions that do not shift blame to other confederates.'
75. Id.
76. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
77. Robins, 812 A.2d at 528 (Saylor, J., concurring).
78. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 530 (Saylor, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 528-29 (Saylor, J., concurring).
82. Robins, 812 A.2d at 528-29 (Saylor, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 529 (Saylor, J., concurring). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Saylor relied
on several cases from other jurisdictions. Id. (citing Denny v. Godmansion, 252 F.3d 896,
902-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 938 (2001); United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401,
416 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 532 U.S. 1012 (2001); United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 627-28 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 660 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Robbins,
197 F.3d 829, 840 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1302 (1st Cir.
1997); United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1994)).
84. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 669 (1st Cir.
2001); and United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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In the next portion of his concurrence, Justice Saylor discussed
the combined effect of heavy government involvement in procuring
Robins' recorded hotel room statements and the records omission
of facts delineating Auman's unavailability as a witness.85 Absent
substantive evidence in the record regarding Auman's unavailabil-
ity, Justice Saylor said he was incapable of determining "whether
the Commonwealth acted on a good faith belief that Auman was
unavailable or according to a preference for the introduction of his
hearsay statements over his personal appearance before the jury
at [Robins'] trial." 6 Absent factual corroboration of Auman's un-
availability, Justice Saylor would have held that the Confronta-
tion Clause prohibited Auman's non-custodial, extrajudicial
statements.7
In conclusion, Justice Saylor indicated the he would have pre-
ferred to remand the case to the Superior Court to determine
whether the hotel room statements would have fit under the con-
conspirator exception, an exception to which the prerequisite of
unavailability is not attached.8 In addition, Justice Saylor would
also have permitted the Superior Court to determine whether Rob-
85. Id. at 530 (Saylor, J., concurring). According to Justice Saylor, statements contrary
to penal interest and witness unavailability are inextricably intertwined according to both
the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and constitutional jurisprudence. Id. (Saylor, J., con-
curring) (citing PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-26 (1968)). Justice Saylor also expressed concern over Auman's
unavailability, since the record indicated that Auman appeared to be in the Common-
wealth's custody. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Saylor stated that
Auman's guilty plea may have effectively negated his ability to raise Fifth Amendment
privileges against self-incrimination, thereby undermining potential availability problems.
Id. (Saylor, J., concurring). In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states: "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. Id. at 531 (Saylor, J., concurring).
87. Robins, 812 A.2d at 531 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Saylor stated his holding
as follows:
I would hold, with regard to third-party hearsay statements of the accomplice of an
accused procured through heavy government involvement which are central aspects
of the prosecution, that admission into evidence as a statement against interest is not
permitted over Confrontation Clause objection where it appears that the witness is
under government control at the time of trial, and the record does not demonstrate
the basis for the witness's unavailability and the government's good faith efforts to
make the witness available.
Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 532 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Saylor noted that both federal procedure
and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence might permit the admission of such statements
made by a coconspirator. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring) (citing PA. R. EvID. 803(25); Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)).
599
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ins' concession to Auman's unavailability was an implied waiver of
Robins' Confrontation Clause challenge.89
Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman, dissented, raising
several challenges to the majority's decision.9  Initially, Justice
Castille found no significant analytical distinction between excul-
patory and inculpatory statements as they pertain to the issue of
trustworthiness. 9'
For the sake of argument, Justice Castille conceded that state-
ments against penal interest did not qualify as a firmly rooted
hearsay exception under Pennsylvania law.9" Still, Justice Castille
qualified the nature of his concession, expressing confidence that
at some future point the United States Supreme Court might find
that some self-incriminating statements made by an unavailable
witness in a non-custodial setting do qualify as a firmly rooted
exception to hearsay evidence.93 Given this possibility, Justice
Castille found the majority's foreclosure of the firmly rooted issue
imprudent."
In the remaining sections of his dissent, Justice Castille quar-
reled with the majority's determination that the contextual cir-
cumstances surrounding Auman's declarations failed to demon-
strate the requisite indicia of reliability.95 To begin his challenge,
89. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 532-33 (Castille, J., dissenting). Regarding this point, Justice Castille stated:
"If the roles were reversed and [Robins] alleged to have played Auman's role in this con-
spiracy, and [Robins] sought to introduce Auman's confessions as proof that the Common-
wealth had the wrong man, would the Court hold that Auman's confessions were unreliable
•.. I think not." Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). While acknowledging that this role reversal
posed no Sixth Amendment issues, Justice Castille nevertheless reasoned that "the reliabil-
ity of a declaration against penal interest should not vary depending upon which party in a
criminal case offers it up." Id. at 533 (Castille, J., dissenting).
92. Robins, 812 A.2d at 533 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille made clear, how-
ever, that his concession was limited to the purposes of this dissent only. Id. (Castille, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 533-34 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille based his assumption on two
United States Supreme Court cases, Lilly v. Virginia and Dutton v. Evans, each of which,
he argued, left open the possibility of some exception to the general prohibition against
admitting declarations against penal interest of an unavailable accomplice. Id. (Castille, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lilly, 527 U.S. 116, 119 (1999); Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-89 (1970)).
94. Id. at 534 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille expressed concern that such an
inflexible holding failed to recognize the subtle relationship between what is newly planted
and what is firmly rooted. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 534-35 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille characterized this portion of
the majority's opinion as a "colorful and imaginative analysis." Id. at 533 (Castille, J.,
dissenting). Although he did not quibble with the factors used by the majority in making
its determination (see supra note 66), he did object to the majority's application of those
factors. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
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Justice Castille distinguished this case from Lilly v. Virginia,"
since Lilly was concerned only with collateral prejudice effectu-
ated by statements that both exculpate the declarant and incul-
pate his accomplice.97
Next, Justice Castille focused on the external residue of credibil-
ity supporting Auman's declarations." First, in contradistinction
to the majority, Justice Castille claimed that since Auman was
still attempting to peddle stolen wares, the inference was that the
conspiracy was still ongoing.'5 Second, Justice Castille asserted
that the non-custodial setting itself sufficiently guaranteed the
authenticity of Auman's statements.1°° Third, rather than at-
tempting to shift blame to a confederate, Auman made his state-
ments pursuant to an exchange intended for his own benefit.10'
Last, Justice Castille asserted that the temporal gap afforded
Auman's statement a modicum of credibility."2  Specifically,
Auman's follow-up conduct in the hotel room demonstrated af-
firmative actions internally consistent with the statement's im-
port."' That Auman showed a peculiar awareness of the inculpa-
tory nature of his statements further demonstrated a conscious
awareness entirely consistent with veracity. '
Justice Castille also criticized the majority for rejecting objec-
tive facts established in the record in favor of vague, hypothesized
possibilities that not only were not supported by the record, but
also contradicted fundamental behavioral assumptions. 5 Rather
96. 527 U.S. 116(1999).
97. Robins, 812 A.2d at 535 (Castille, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Castille found a
palpable difference between a murder charge (Lilly) and Robin's conspiracy charge in which
Auman's statement proved the corpus delicti of the conspiracy charge. Id. (Castille, J.,
dissenting) (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994)). Corpus delicti is
loosely defined as "the physical evidence of a crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (7th ed.
2000).
98. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). For Justice Castille, the non-custodial setting ensured
that Auman had nothing to gain by his self-incrimination, since he did not know that the
police were actually involved. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). Moreover, the non-custodial
setting eliminated potential police coercion. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). Far from respond-
ing to police coercion, Justice Castille stated that "Auman volunteered [the statements], in
a fashion that was internally consistent and which suggested a familiarity with the crime
that necessarily bespoke reliability." Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
102. Robins, 812 A.2d at 536 (Castille, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 535-36 (Castille, J., dissenting). Regarding this point, Justice Castille said
Auman "put his money where his mouth was...." Id. at 535 (Castille, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 536 (Castille, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille pointed out that the majority opinion
postulates that Auman's declarations to Downey in the cellblock "may have been" attempts
Spring 2004 601
Duquesne Law Review
than hold that the mere existence of other possibilities inexorably
rendered Auman's statements inadmissible as a matter of law,
Justice Castille contended that such hypothetical musings are bet-
ter left for the jury to determine." Furthermore, Justice Castille
argued that it defies logic to assume, as he argued the majority
did, that a person is just as likely to take credit for a crime he did
not commit as it is for him to take credit for a crime he did com-
mit.
10 7
The final section of Justice Castille's dissent disputed Justice
Saylor's concurrence, specifically his concerns for Auman's un-
availability.05 Although recognizing that Robins' failure to press
the unavailability of Auman had certain tactical advantages for
Robins, Justice Castille dismissed the import of the issue because
neither party ever disputed Auman's unavailability.09 As a result,
Justice Castille agreed with the majority that the issue of un-
availability was beyond the scope of appellate review.
Justice Eakin, in an opinion also joined by Justice Newman,
dissented, finding that Auman's statement was sufficiently cor-
roborated by the circumstance in which it was proffered."' Like
Justice Castille, Justice Eakin concluded that only someone inti-
mately involved with a crime would brag about it, especially since
the crime was stale and forgotten in the minds of the unin-
volved.' Regarding the involvement of the police in procuring
Auman's declarations in the hotel room, Justice Eakin concluded
to impress a fellow inmate. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). At another time, Justice Castille
noted that the majority said that Auman's statements were "likely braggadocio." Id. (Cas-
tille, J., dissenting). And by the end of the majority opinion, Justice Castille claimed that
the one-time hypothetical possibilities became objective facts, as when the majority stated
that Auman "had to continue the picture of the notorious burglar ... " Id. (Castille, J.,
dissenting).
106. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
107. Robins, 812 A.2d at 537 (Castille, J., dissenting). As Justice Castille put it: "If
human nature is to be accorded any role in our analysis, we must continue to recognize that
it is highly unusual to falsely confess to an unsolved crime. It is more unusual to falsely
confess to a stranger, since that circumstance is fraught with unknown peril." Id. (Castille,
J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 538 (Castille, J., dissenting). Like Justice Saylor, Justice Castille expressed
some skepticism at Robins' failure to press the unavailability issue, especially since under
Pennsylvania law the against penal interest exception has been permitted only when the
witness is truly unavailable. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). But Justice Castille recognized
that, had Robins pursued the issue, he may have actually pressed Auman into testifying
against him, a situation that may have resulted in direct, incriminating testimony against
him. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 538-39 (Castille, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 539 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
112. Robins, 812 A.2d at 539 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
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that this fact had relevance only if Auman was aware of their in-
volvement or if the police somehow coerced the statements from
him.' Justice Eakin ended his dissent by agreeing with the ma-
jority that Auman's purported narcotics use had no relevance."'
Because Justice Eakin determined that there was no reason to
find Auman's statements unreliable, he would have admitted
them into evidence over Robins' Sixth Amendment challenge."5
The United States Supreme Court's first major case involving
the interplay between hearsay evidence and Confrontation Clause
mandates was in Mattox v. United States."' In Mattox, because
both witnesses at issue were deceased at the time of trial, the trial
court allowed the reporter's notes of their former testimony to be
introduced into evidence." 7 While recognizing the Confrontation
Clause's emphasis on the right to cross-examine a witness at
trial,"8 the Court determined that "[tihe law . . . declares that the
rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an
incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.""9 Since the
testimony in question had previously been subjected to cross-
examination at an earlier trial, the Court concluded that "the sub-
stance of the constitutional protection had been preserved," and
therefore no Confrontation Clause violation occurred, despite the
defendant's current inability to cross-examine the witnesses.2 °
The Court revisited the Confrontation Clause-hearsay dilemma
again, more than a half-century later, in Pointer v. State of
Texas." 1 In Pointer, a witness, Phillips, testified at a preliminary
113. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
116. 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
117. Id. at 238. In 1891, the defendant was convicted of murder, a charge subsequently
reversed and remanded by the United States Supreme Court. Id at 239. At the subsequent
trial, the defendant was again convicted of murder, and again the Supreme Court reviewed
the case. Id.
118. Id. at 239. In summarizing the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, the Court
stated:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex part affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a person ex-
amination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an oppor-
tunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43.
119. Id. at 243.
120. Id. at 244.
121. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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hearing against the defendant, Pointer, who at the time was not
represented by counsel.1 2 Prior to trial, Phillips moved to Califor-
nia and was therefore unable to testify at trial.' In lieu of the
witness' live testimony, the prosecution, over the defendant's ob-
jections, read the preliminary hearing testimony into evidence.'24
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
conviction, finding no substantive constitutional violation.' 5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 1 6 and disagreed with the Texas
courts.
2 7
In reaching its conclusion, the Court clarified the interrelation
of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause in two important re-
spects: first, finding the right to confront witnesses at trial a fun-
damental right, the Court made the Confrontation Clause binding
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution; second, the Court held that because the
"statement had not been taken at a time and under circumstances
affording [the defendant] through counsel an adequate opportu-
nity to cross-examine Phillips," its admission into trial offended
the Confrontation Clause.9 Regarding the Confrontation Clause,
the Court reaffirmed its belief that "a major reason underlying the
constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged
with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him."3 °
The Supreme Court again examined the interplay between the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay evidence in Bruton v. United
States.3' In Bruton, two defendants (Bruton and Evans) were
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 401-02. Defendant's counsel raised Confrontation Clause challenges to the
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony, stating, "Your Honor, we will object to
that, as it is a denial of the confrontment of the witnesses against the Defendant." Id. at
401.
125. Id. at 402. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was "the highest state court to
which the case could be taken." Id.
126. Certiorari is '[a] writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a
lower court to deliver the record in the case for review. The U.S. Supreme Court uses cer-
tiorari to review most of the cases that it decides to hear." BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 179
(7th ed. 2000).
127. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 402, 408.
128. Id. at 403. In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
129. Id. at 407-08.
130. Id. at 406-07.
131. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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tried jointly on charges of armed postal robbery. 132  At trial, a
postal inspector testified regarding two confessions made by Ev-
ans in which he admitted not only to committing the robbery, but
also to having an unnamed accomplice. 3 3  Despite the prosecu-
tion's attempt to use the confessions as substantive evidence
against Bruton, the judge admonished the jury that although it
could consider the confessions as evidence against Evans, they
were precluded from using the confession as evidence against
Bruton.'34 Both defendants appealed their convictions to the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.' 35 Although overturning Evans'
conviction,136 the court of appeals affirmed Bruton's conviction,137
finding the judge's limiting instruction to the jury sufficiently
curative of any Confrontation Clause problems.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
reconsider its holding in Delli Paoli v. United States,39 the case
upon which the court of appeals grounded its decision. 140 In Delli
Paoli, the Court held that a jury could reasonably follow a limiting
instruction telling them to disregard a codefendant's extrajudicial
confession which implicated the defendant.' But the Court noted,
however, that, since Delli Paoli, it had consistently moved away
from that holding.' 42  Following this trend, the Court concluded
132. Id. at 124.
133. Id. In his second confession, Evans admitted to having an accomplice but stopped
short of naming him. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-25. Because the trial took place a week after the Supreme
Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, the court of appeals found Miranda applicable to the
case. Id. at 124 n.1. Since no warnings of any kind were administered prior to Evans'
confessions, the court of appeals deemed the confessions inadmissible, as they pertained to
Evans. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 125.
139. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
140. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 125.
141. Id. at 126 (citing Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 239).
142. Id. at 126-27. In Douglas v. Sate of Alabama, for example, the Court held that a
defendant's inability to cross-examine a non-testifying coconspirator denied the defendant's
rights accorded by the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 127 (citing Douglas v. State of Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965)). The Court concluded that while the coconspirator's refusal
to answer was not testimony, it nevertheless enabled a situation in which the jury could
wrongly conclude both the fact that the statement was made and that it was true. Id. (cit-
ing Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419). And in Jackson v. Denno, the Court repudiated the basic
premise of Delli Paoli, regarding the voluntariness of a confession. Id. at 128 (citing Jack-
son v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964)). There, the Court specifically rejected the proposi-
tion that a jury, when determining the confessor's guilt, could be relied on to ignore the
confession of guilt should it find the confession involuntary. Id. (citing Jackson, 378 U.S. at
388-89).
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that regardless of a clear limiting instruction to the jury, the po-
tential collateral damage emanating from a non-testifying code-
fendant's extrajudicial statements was too severe to go unmolested
by confrontational testing.' As the Court concluded: "The unreli-
ability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the al-
leged accomplice .. does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-
examination."'"
The testimony at issue in Evans v. Dutton... involved a pur-
ported statement made by a coconspirator to a cellmate which di-
rectly inculpated the defendant.' 46  Although the defendant ob-
jected, claiming the admission of the statement violated his right
to confront the witness, the trial court overruled the objection, and
defense counsel subsequently cross-examined the witness.'4 After
his conviction, the defendant appealed to the Georgia Supreme
Court.' 8 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, re-
jecting the defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge. 49 Like the
trial court, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the introduction of
the statement based on Georgia's statutory exception to hearsay
evidence for coconspirators. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the judgment, holding that the statement's ad-
mission violated the defendant's right to confront the witness.1
5 '
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and rejected the court of
appeals ruling as contrary to its Confrontation Clause jurispru-
143. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137. As the Court indicated, "when the admissible confession of
one defendant inculpates another defendant, the confession is never deleted from the case.
... [The jury] cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A com-
mitted criminal acts with B and at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclu-
sion that B has committed those same criminal acts." Id. at 131.
144. Id. at 136. Despite its conclusion, the Court did not hold that "every admission of
inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable
through limiting instructions...." Id. at 135.
145. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
146. Id. at 77-78. The statement at issue occurred after the declarant had returned from
his arraignment hearing. Id. at 77. Upon his return, his celimate [Shaw] asked him, "How
did you make out in court?" Id. The defendant [Williams] responded: "If it hadn't been for
that dirty son-of-a-bitch, Alex Evans [defendant], we wouldn't be in this now." Id.
147. Id. at 77-78.
148. Id. at 78.
149. Id.
150. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 78. In relevant part, the Georgia statute provides that "[a]fter
the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators dur-
ing the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all." Id. (citing GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954)).
151. Id. at 76. In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals determined that no
grounds existed for Georgia's statutory hearsay exception. Id. at 79. In particular, the
court noted that Georgia's exception "was broader than that applicable to conspiracy trials
in the federal courts." Id.
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dence."5' Although the Court declined to equate Confrontation
Clause requirements with hearsay evidentiary rules,'53 the Court
did not find the disparity between Georgia's statutory hearsay ex-
ception and the federal rule sufficient to render Georgia's statute
unconstitutional.' Moreover, unlike prior cases finding Confron-
tation Clause violations, the testimony in this case was not essen-
tial to the defendant's conviction'55 since, among other things, a
total of nineteen other witnesses, including one eyewitness, testi-
fied against the defendant.' Perhaps more importantly, the
Court emphasized that defendant's counsel had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness intensely about the veracity of his tes-
timony."' And last, the Court concluded that since the statements
made were spontaneous and against the defendant's penal inter-
est, they were sufficiently reliable to overcome a Confrontation
Clause challenge. 58
In Ohio v. Roberts,'9 the Supreme Court purported to apply a
"general approach" to questions involving the interaction of the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay evidence. 6 ° Roberts involved
the admissibility of testimony procured from a witness at a pre-
liminary hearing but who was subsequently unavailable to testify
at trial. 6' Against a Confrontation Clause challenge by the defen-
dant, the trial court permitted a transcript of the witness' prelimi-
nary hearing testimony to be admitted as evidence at trial.6 ' The
152. Id. at 79.
153. Id. at 86.
154. Id. at 81. Unlike the federal rule, the Georgia statute included statements made in
the concealment phase of the conspiracy. Id. But as the Court stated regarding this point:
"We cannot say that the evidentiary rule applied by Georgia violates the Constitution
merely because it does not exactly coincide with the hearsay exception applicable in the
decidedly different context of federal prosecution for the substantive offense of conspiracy."
Id. at 83.
155. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87. The Court characterized the testimony at issue as "of pe-
ripheral significance at most." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. As the Court stated:
The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying as to what he has heard;
it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements. From
the viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-
examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable
informant not only as to what he has seen but also as to what he has heard.
Id. at 88.
158. Id. at 89.
159. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
160. Id. at 65.
161. Id. at 58-59.
162. Id. at 59. In reaching its decision, the court relied on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.49 (1975), which allows the use of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness unable
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Court of Appeals of Ohio overturned the conviction.' Relying on
the Supreme Court's decision in Barber v. Page," the court of ap-
peals concluded that the record failed to indicate a good faith ef-
fort on the part of the state to secure the witness's availability at
trial.' The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals'
decision, holding that a cross-examination at a preliminary hear-
ing does not afford sufficient constitutional protection to overcome
Confrontation Clause concerns. 66
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the relationship between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation
Clause.' In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court presented
what it characterized as a general approach to analyzing the ad-
missibility of hearsay statements against Confrontation Clause
challenge.' s In general, the Court concluded that the Confronta-
tion Clause limits hearsay testimony in two important ways. 69
First, because the Confrontation Clause exhibits a preference for
direct confrontation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of
necessity.7 Accordingly, to satisfy this rule, the State must, at a
minimum, demonstrate the unavailability of the witness whose
statement it wishes to introduce. 7' Second, if unavailability is
properly shown, those hearsay statements marked with sufficient
indicia of trustworthiness will be admitted.'72 Justice Blackmun
"for any reason to be produced at trial." Id. To determine the admissibility of the testi-
mony, the court conducted a voir dire hearing. Id. At the hearing, the location of the wit-
ness could not firmly be established. Id. at 59-60.
163. Id. at 60.
164. 390 U.S. 719, 722-25. In Barber, the Court held that the reading of a witness' pre-
liminary hearing testimony into evidence at trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront the witness, since the State failed to show that the witness was
unavailable to testify at trial." Barber, 390 U.S. at 725-26.
165. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60.
166. Id. at 60-61. The Court found that the court of appeals erred regarding the witness'
availability. Id. Unlike the witness at issue in Barber v. Page, whose location was known
to the State, the court concluded that the voir dire sufficiently established the unavailabil-
ity of the witness. Id. at 61.
167. Id. at 62.
168. Id. at 65-66.
169. Id. at 65.
170. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
171. Id. The Court did indicate that in circumstances where the utility of direct confron-
tation is minimal, the State need not demonstrate unavailability. Id. at n.7 (citing Dutton,
400 U.S. at 91).
172. Id. (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)). As the Court indi-
cated, the thrust of the indicia of reliability requirement rests on the conclusion that "cer-
tain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any
evidence within them comports with" the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 66 (citing Mattox, 156
U.S. at 244).
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indicated that such reliability "can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception."173 Absent qualifying as a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion, only those statements which demonstrate a "particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness" may be admitted at trial.
174
Applying the new test to the facts in Roberts, the Court con-
cluded that not only had the unavailability of the witness been
properly established, but also that since the witness had been
cross-examined at the preliminary hearing, the witness' state-
ments bore the requisite marks of trustworthiness to circumvent
Confrontation Clause objections. 175  This conclusion, the Court
found, properly balanced the practical concerns of criminal proce-
dure with the confrontation requirements of the Sixth Amend-
ment.
17 6
The Supreme Court subsequently reexamined the efficacy of re-
daction and limiting instructions in Richardson v. Marsh,177 this
time restricting the reach of the Court's previous holding in
Bruton.7 ' The issue in Richardson was whether Bruton com-
mands the same conclusion when a codefendant's confession is
redacted to omit references to the defendant, but to which the de-
fendant is linked by other evidence presented at trial.'79 At trial,
the confession of a codefendant was admitted into evidence after
all references to the defendant, both direct and indirect, were re-
moved.' The trial judge also admonished the jury that the con-
fession could not be used as evidence against the defendant.'
After her conviction, the defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus"'petition, alleging, in part, that admitting the codefendant's confes-
173. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. As the Court determined, the indicia of reliability approach
is predicated on the understanding "that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with 'the sub-
stance of the constitutional protections'." Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 67-75.
176. Id. at 63-64.
177. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
178. Id. at 202.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 203.
181. Id. at 204-05. The first admonition was prior to the introduction of the confession
at trial, and the second admonition was before jury deliberations commenced. Id. The
prosecutor himself proffered a similar caveat to the jury during closing arguments. Id. at
205.
182. A writ of habeas corpus is "employed to bring a person before a court, most fre-
quently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 2000).
Spring 2004 609
Duquesne Law Review
sion at trial violated her right to confront a witness against her.
8 3
The district court denied the request,"M but the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision.' 8 According to the
court of appeals, a Bruton-type assessment of confessions made by
a non-testifying codefendant required a determination of the in-
culpatory value of the confession, both on its face and in light of
other evidence presented at trial.'86 Because, as the court con-
cluded, the codefendant's confession was the only direct evidence
against the defendant, it "was powerfully incriminating to [the
defendant] with respect to the critical element of intent,"87 and its
use at trial therefore eviscerated the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights. The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve conflicts among the federal circuits on this is-
189sue.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia distinguished Marsh
from Bruton, because, unlike the confession in Bruton, the confes-
sion in Marsh did not directly implicate the defendant in the
crime. 90 As such, Justice Scalia concluded that the Bruton Court's
concern with collateral prejudice was not implicated when a de-
fendant is only indirectly inculpated. 9' Accordingly, Justice Scalia
found that the twin pillars of a limiting jury instruction and of
redaction provided sufficient Sixth Amendment protection, since a
jury is more likely to obey such an instruction when there is only
an inferential inculpatory connection between the confessor and
the defendant.'92 As a result, Justice Scalia ruled that there was
no need to extend the Bruton rule to a case where a codefendant's
183. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 205.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 205-06.
187. Id. at 206 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 781 F.2d 1201, 1213 (6th Cir. 1986)).
188. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 208. As Justice Scalia pointed out: "[fln this case the confession was not
incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at
trial." Id.
191. Id. In its decision, the court of appeals specifically noted that other appellate courts
had "declined to adopt the 'evidentiary linkage' or 'contextual implication' approach to
Bruton questions." Id. at 206.
192. Id. at 208-09. Justice Scalia predicated his conclusion on the grounds that the law
assumes "that jurors follow their instructions." Id. at 206. Regarding jury instructions,
Justice Scalia also said, "the rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a
pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in
the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the
state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." Id. at 211.
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confession is redacted to remove all references to the defendant,
and it is also accompanied by a carefully crafted limiting instruc-
tion to the jury.'9'
The Court again applied Roberts' general approach in Idaho v.
Wright.19 4 Wright involved the admissibility of an extrajudicial
statement made by a three year old in response to questions posed
by her doctor about alleged child abuse.'95 Despite the defendants'
objections to the contrary, the trial court, pursuant to Idaho's re-
sidual hearsay exception, allowed the doctor to testify regarding
the child's statements.'96 On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,
one defendant contended that the admission of the doctor's testi-
mony regarding the child's statements violated her Confrontation
Clause rights."' The Idaho Supreme Court accepted this conten-
tion and reversed the conviction.'98 In so doing, the court con-
cluded that the trial court erred in admitting the incriminating
hearsay testimony of the child, since such testimony was not a
recognized exception to hearsay evidence, based, as they were, on
an interview devoid of significant procedural safeguards. '99 The
court further concluded that because the interview was conducted
by someone with preconceived notions about what information
should be disclosed, the statements also lacked the specific guar-
antees of credibility necessary to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and al-
though ultimately rejecting the Idaho Supreme Court's ration-
193. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
194. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
195. Id. at 809.
196. Id. 809-11. In pertinent part, Idaho's residual hearsay exception states:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the pro-
ponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence.
Id. at 812 (citing IDAHO R. EvID. 803(24)).
197. Id. at 812. The second defendant offered a separate argument on appeal, arguing
that the trial court erred in admitting the doctor's testimony under Idaho's residual hear-
say exception. Id. Because the Idaho Supreme Court rejected this contention, the issue
was not before the United States Supreme Court. Id.
198. Id.
199. Wright, 497 U.S. at 812.
200. Id. at 813.
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ale,2"' the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, af-
firmed the decision." 2 In reaching its conclusion, the Court em-
ployed Roberts' general approach.203 Justice O'Connor agreed that,
for the purposes of this case, the witness was unavailable.Y
Moreover, Justice O'Connor concluded that Idaho's residual hear-
say rule was not a firmly rooted exception to hearsay evidence,
because, as she stated, such statements "do not share the same
tradition of reliability that supports the admissibility of state-
ments under a firmly rooted hearsay exception."2 ' Turning to the
question of whether the hearsay statements were marked by suffi-
cient indicia of reliability, Justice O'Connor concluded that such a
determination must be made by looking at the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the statements in an effort to assess
whether the declarant was likely to be telling the truth .0  Given
the context in which the child's statements were made, including
the doctor's leading questioning and his preconceived notions
about what he wanted to hear, Justice O'Connor found that the
statements were insufficiently credible to overcome Confrontation
Clause mandates.0 7
201. Id. at 813, 818. As the Court stated: "[W]e reject the apparently dispositive weight
placed by that court on the lack of procedural safeguards at the interview .... [We do not
believe the Constitution imposes a fixed set of procedural prerequisites to the admission of
such statements at trial." Id. Thus, the Court concluded: "[We decline to read into the
Confrontation Clause a preconceived and artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety
of professional interviews in which children make hearsay statements against a defen-
dant." Id. at 819.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 815.
204. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816. As Justice O'Connor indicated, both the trial court and
defense counsel agreed that the witness "was incapable of communicating with the jury."
Id.
205. Id. at 817. According to the Court, "[a]dmission under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight ac-
corded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of
certain types of out-of-court statements." Id.
206. Id. at 820.
207. Id. at 826. The Court also rejected the State's argument that corroborating evi-
dence external to the statements rendered the statements inherently reliable. Id. at 822.
As Justice O'Connor concluded:
[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's 'particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness' would permit the admission of a presumptively unreli-
able statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a
result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under
the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant
would be of marginal utility.
Id. at 823.
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The U.S. Supreme Court also revisited the Roberts availability
requirement in United States v. Inadi.°5 The issue before the
Court was whether the Confrontation Clause required a showing
of unavailability before statements made by a coconspirator could
be admitted at trial.0 9 Over the objections of the defendant,21 ° the
trial court admitted tape recorded statements of various calls
made among a number of conspirators, many of whom did not tes-
tify at trial.2 1' The trial court reasoned that since the statements
were made in furtherance of a conspiracy, they were admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).
2 1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the conviction." 3 Although agreeing that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) had
been satisfied, the court ruled that the Confrontation Clause
mandated a showing of unavailability prior to the admission of
214
extrajudicial statements.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether a showing of unavailability was a constitutionally man-
dated condition precedent to statements made by a coconspira-
tor.21 5 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell concluded that a
showing of a witness' unavailability was not constitutionally re-
quired.2"' In reaching this conclusion, the Court narrowed the rule
of necessity first articulated in Roberts, limiting the rule of neces-
sity to cases involving prior testimony.1 7 Although not without
merit, Justice Powell concluded that the burdens imposed by the
208. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
209. Id. at 388.
210. Id. at 390. The defendant proffered two objections. Id. First, the defendant argued
that the statements at issue were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus failed
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which excludes from hearsay "a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. at n.1.
(citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)). Concomitantly, defendant also argued that without a
showing that the declarant was unavailable, the statements were inadmissible against the
Confrontation Clause. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 390 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)). See supra note 18.
213. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 391.
214. Id. The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,
which it claimed made a showing of unavailability a constitutional requirement. Id. (citing
United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1984)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 400.
217. ld. at 392-93. Justice Powell concluded that even the Roberts' Court never intended
its decision to be a blueprint for determining hearsay evidence questions. Id. at 392 (citing
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65). Moreover, Justice Powell said that a rigid rule of necessity
would necessarily preclude all extrajudicial statements, a conclusion he argued the Con-
frontation Clause did not anticipate. Id. at 392.
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rule of necessity were outweighed by the potential benefits of
statements given by coconspirators.21' Following this logic, the
Court affirmed the use of coconspirator statements and rejected
imposing a blanket requirement of unavailability prior to their
admission.219
Lee v. Illinios220 was a joint trial of codefendants charged with
double murder.2 1  Importantly, confessions by both defendants
were central to both the prosecution and the defendants' cases.222
In convicting the defendants, however, the trial judge relied on
one of the confessions to the exclusion of the other.23
On appeal, Lee contended that the trial judge's use of her code-
fendant's confession as evidence against her violated her Confron-
tation Clause rights, and that her conviction should therefore be
overturned.2 4  While agreeing that the trial judge had used the
codefendant's confession as evidence against her, the court of ap-
peals denied that defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause were violated, since, as it concluded, the confessions were
interlocking.25 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the defendant's
appeal. 2 ' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the trial judge's use of a codefendant's confession
as evidence against the defendant did indeed offend the Confron-
tation Clause. 7
In holding that defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause were violated, the Court analogized this case to Douglas v.
Alabama,228 in which the Court held that the inability to confront
an accomplice's alleged confession violated the defendant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause.29 For the Court, the violations in
218. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397-99. As the Court stated: "A rule that required each invoca-
tion of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to be accompanied by a decision on the declarant's availability
would impose a substantial burden on the entire criminal justice system." Id. at 399.
219. Id. at 400.
220. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
221. Id. at 531. Neither defendant testified at trial. Id.
222. Id. at 536.
223. Id. at 538.
224. Id.
225. Lee, 476 U.S. at 538. Although finding that the confessions were interlocking, the
court of appeals provided no working definition of what interlocking confessions meant. Id.
at 538-39. Instead, the court simply held that interlocking confessions did not fall within
the Bruton rule, which it said proscribed the use at trial of a codefendant's confession when
it implicated the defendant in criminal activity. Id.
226. Id. at 539.
227. Id.
228. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
229. Lee, 476 U.S. at 546 (citing Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419).
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this case were even more egregious, since they stood in contradis-
tinction to the very purpose of the Confrontation Clause.23 The
Court also determined that the confession at issue lacked the req-
uisite indicia of truthfulness to overcome the strong presumption
against the reliability accorded coconspirator confessions when
used against a defendant.23' Because the confession was elicited
by the police, who knew exactly what they wanted to hear, and
because the declarant had ample reason to distort the facts to the
defendant's detriment, the confession was not sufficiently reliable
to overcome a Confrontation Clause challenge. 32 That the two
confessions significantly overlapped regarding important details
was inconsequential, for the points on which they diverged were
central to a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence.2 3
And since the inculpatory confession was unreliable, its use with-
out the defendant's ability to cross-examine the declarant ran
afoul of the Confrontation Clause preference for face-to-face con-
frontation.2"
In Bourjaily v. United States,235 the United States Supreme
Court further restricted Roberts, holding that an inquiry into indi-
cia reliability was not constitutionally mandated.236 At trial, the
judge admitted tape recorded statements of a non-testifying cocon-
spirator into evidence, despite the defendant's Confrontation
Clause challenge.237 The trial judge grounded his decision on Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), concluding that since the re-
corded statements were made in furtherance of an ongoing con-
spiracy, they were not hearsay, and therefore they were admissi-
ble.238 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
agreed with the trial court's admissibility determination and re-
jected defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge.239 In affirming
230. Id. at 543. As the Court put it: "The danger against which the Confrontation
Clause was erected-the conviction of a defendant based, at least in part, on presumptively
unreliable evidence-actually occurred. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 544-45.
233. Id. at 546. According to the Court, the confessions diverged on defendant's in-
volvement in the planning of the one murder and her facilitation of the other murder, fac-
tors the Court refused to deem inconsequential. Id.
234. Lee, 476 U.S. at 546. Although reversing the judgment, the Court did not foreclose
the possibility that the harm done by the admission was harmless; thus, the Court re-
manded the matter for further consideration on this point. Id. at 547.
235. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
236. Id. at 182.
237. Id. at 174.




the trial court's decision, the court of appeals held that the re-
quirements for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) automati-
cally satisfied Confrontation Clause mandates.24 °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine whether an
independent inquiry into the reliability of extrajudicial statements
is constitutionally required.241 Relying on the Court's own analysis
in Roberts, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that no independent
inquiry need be undertaken if out-of-court statements made by the
non-testifying coconspirator qualify as a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay evidence rule.242 Finding that the coconspirator excep-
tion to hearsay evidence was firmly rooted in its jurisprudence,
the Chief Justice concluded that no separate inquiry into reliabil-
ity was necessary, since the statements made by the conconspira-
243tor were made in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy.
The Court's most recent Confrontation Clause analysis came in
Lilly v. Virginia.2" In Lilly, the Court once again addressed the
relationship between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay evi-
dence, only this time in the context of extrajudicial statements
against penal interest made by a non-testifying witness that im-
plicated the defendant.245 In this case, Mark Lilly, the declarant,
gave two recorded statements to the police.2" Although Mark's
statements implicated all three men in the alleged crime-spree, by
shifting the blame from Mark to his brother, Benjamin, Mark's
statements also tended to militate against his specific involvement
in the murder of DeFilippis."7 At trial, Mark invoked his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.24 The state then
sought to introduce Mark's tape recorded statements, contending
240. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182.
241. Id. at 173.
242. Id. at 183.
243. Id. at 183-84.
244. 527 U.S. 116 (1990).
245. Id. at 120. According to the police, three men, Mark Lilly, his brother Benjamin
Lee Lilly, and his roommate Gary Wayne Barker, committed a series of crimes in a two-day
long crime spree. Id. On December 4, 1995, the three men "broke into a home and stole nine
bottles of liquor, three loaded guns, and a safe." Id. On the following day, "the men drank the stolen
liquor, robbed a small country store, and shot at geese with their stolen weapons. After their car broke
down, they abducted Alex DeFilippis and used his vehicle to drive to a deserted location. One of them
shot and killed DeFilippis." Id. Moreover, before their arrest on the evening of December 5, 1995, the
three men committed two additional robberies. Id.
246. Id. at 121.
247. Id. Although admitting some involvement in the burglary, Mark distanced himself
from the murder, saying he "didn't have nothing to do with the shooting." Id. Barker also
told police that Benjamin Lee Lilly "masterminded the robberies and was the one who had
killed DeFilippis." Id. at 120-21.
248. Id. at 121.
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that because they were the statements against the penal interest
of an unavailable witness, they were admissible against both
hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.249 Benjamin Lilly
objected, arguing not only that statements which tend to shift
blame are not statements against penal interest, but also that
their admission violated his Confrontation Clause right to cross-
examination.25 ° Over the objection, the trial judge admitted both
the tape recorded statements and written transcripts of the re-
cordings in full; the jury subsequently convicted Benjamin, rec-
ommending the death sentence for capital murder.251
The Virginia Supreme Court concurred with the trial court's de-
cision and affirmed the defendant's conviction.252 The court con-
cluded that, as statements against penal interest, they qualified
as an exception to hearsay evidence under Virginia law. 53 More-
over, the court rejected the defendant's Confrontation Clause chal-
lenge, since it concluded that the statements qualified as a firmly
rooted exception to hearsay evidence. 254  And even though the
statements shifted some blame to the defendant, the court ruled
that such mitigating circumstances were relevant only to the im-
port a jury could afford them and not to their admissibility."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was in accord
with its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.256 A plurality of the
Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusion
and reversed the decision.257 The plurality's analysis, penned by
249. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121.
250. Id. at 121-22.
251. Id. at 122. Heeding the jury's recommendation, the court imposed the death sen-
tence on Benjamin. Id. The jury also found Benjamin Lilly guilty of "robbery, abduction,
carjacking, possession of a firearm by a felon, and four charges of illegal use of a firearm, for which
offenses he received consecutive prison sentences of two life terms plus 27 years." Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. Important to the court's reasoning on this point was the fact that other evi-
dence admitted at trial buttressed the reliability of Mark's out-of-court statements. Id.
254. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 122. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
White v. Illinois, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that hearsay statements supported
by sufficient indicia of reliability were a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule pe-
forcely satisfying Confrontation Clause mandates. Id. Thus, the court concluded:
"[A]dmissiblity into evidence of the statement against penal interest of an unavailable
witness is a 'firmly rooted' exception to the hearsay rule in Virginia." Id.
255. Id. at 122-23.
256. Id. at 123.
257. Id. at 140. The decision produced a fractured opinion in which "Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts, I, II, and VI, and an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V in which Justice
Souter, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer join[ed]." Id. at 120. Justice Scalia joined
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Justice Stevens, began by recognizing that the question of
whether statements are against penal interest is a matter of state
law.258  But despite this concession, Justice Stevens made clear
that the question of whether a statement falls within a firmly
rooted exception hearsay exception is a matter of federal law.259
Accordingly, Justice Stevens next turned to a determination of
whether statements against penal interest qualify as a firmly
rooted exception to hearsay evidence. 20 Based on past precedent,
Justice Stevens opined that declarations against penal interest
was too broad a category for meaningful Confrontation Clause
analysis.261 Given that, Justice Stevens focused on narrower cate-
gory of evidence against penal interest which attempts to estab-
lish the guilt of an accomplice.262 Unlike other exceptions to hear-
say evidence, Justice Stevens noted that incriminating confessions
made by a coconspirator were "of quite recent vintage."263 More-
over, Justice Stevens added that the Court had previously deter-
mined that against penal interest statements were presumptively
unreliable, at least with respect to the non-self-inculpatory por-
tions.2" As a result, Justice Stevens concluded that inculpatory
confessions made by an accomplice against a defendant failed to
qualify as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.265
Having declared such statements beyond the purview of a hear-
say exception, Justice Stevens turned to whether the statements
Parts 1, 11, and VI of the Court's opinion and concurred in the judgment. Id. at 143. Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment and joined the Court's opinion in Parts I and VI. Jus-
tice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment and was joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice
O'Connor. Id. at 144.
258. Id. at 125.
259. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 125.
260. Id. at 126.
261. Id. at 127 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. at 544).
262. Id. In total, Justice Stevens articulated three situations in which statements
against penal interest are offered at trial: "(1) as voluntary admissions against the decla-
rant; (2) as exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant who claims that the declarant
committed, or was involved in, the offense; and (3) as evidence offered by the prosecution to
establish the guilt of an alleged accomplice of the defendant." Id. Because Justice Stevens
concluded that only the third category was implicated in the case, his opinion focused pri-
marily on that issue. Id.
263. Id. at 130.
264. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133 (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. 594, 599-601 (1994)). Justice
Stevens also referenced the Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(3) for additional support for
this conclusion. Id. at n.3. See supra note 20. Justice Stevens indicated that the Court
had construed Rule 804(b)(3) to mean that non-self-inculpatory against penal interest
statements were presumptively unreliable because "[olne of the most effective ways to lie is
to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of
its self-incriminatory nature." Id. (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-601).
265. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
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were inherently reliable. 6  Rejecting the state's argument that
appellate court should defer to the lower court's assessment of re-
liability, Justice Stevens said that an appellate court should un-
dertake a separate review of the circumstances in which the
statements were made."' In undertaking this analysis, Justice
Stevens rejected each argument proffered by the state in support
of reliability.266 As Justice Stevens concluded: "neither the words
that [Mark] spoke nor the setting in which he was questioned pro-
vides any basis for concluding that his comment regarding
[Benjamin's] guilt were so reliable that there was no need to sub-
ject them to adversarial testing in a trial setting."269
Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist re-
jected the plurality's steadfast ruling that statements against pe-
nal interest necessarily fall outside a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay rule.2 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist also criticized the
breadth of the plurality's holding prohibiting the state's use of an
accomplice's incriminating statements against a defendant.' Ac-
cordingly, the Chief Justice would have held that a custodial con-
fession shifting sole blame on a defendant is not a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule..2  But he left open the question of
whether statements that both inculpate the coconspirator and
shift some of the blame satisfied the firm rooting test.273
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Commonwealth v.
Robbins is another important step in the ongoing delineation of
266. Id. at 135.
267. Id. at 136-37.
268. Id. at 137-39. Justice Stevens rejected that argument that hearsay statements are
made reliable when corroborated by other evidence introduced at trial. Id. at 137-38. As
Justice Stevens stated: "To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause . . . 'hearsay
evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its in-
herent trustworthiness, not be reference to other evidence at trial." Id. at 138 (quoting
Wright, 497 U.S. at 822). Moreover, Justice Stevens rejected the argument that the ad-
ministration of Miranda rights provided contextual support for reliability. Id. at 139.
Justice Stevens also determined that the declarant's conscious knowledge of his self-
incrimination only restated the fact that the statements were contrary to his penal interest.
Id.
269. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139. Given that Mark was in police custody for the crimes
charged, that he was aware of the seriousness of the charged crimes, and that he was re-
sponding to leading questions totally devoid of adversarial testing, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that 'Mark had a natural motive to attempt to exculpate himself as much as possi-
ble." Id.
270. Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
271. Id. at 147-48. As the Chief Justice said, the plurality's blanket ban "sweeps beyond
the facts of this case and our precedent...." Id. at 148 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
272. Id. at 148 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
273. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Although far from bringing
analytical closure to this somewhat enigmatic terrain, at bottom
the ruling confirms that the Confrontation Clause and hearsay
evidence are not coextensive, and that the Confrontation Clause
remains a real and robust Sixth Amendment requirement, one
standing over and against evidentiary rules. And while Robins
does not finally suture the exegetical nexus between the Confron-
tation Clause and hearsay evidence, it does further delimit the
outer reaches of the two concepts, the penumbral point at which
their seemingly intractable synergy wanes and they become sepa-
rate and distinct entities, concepts with sometimes similar pur-
suits but often dissimilar applications. A contrary ruling would
have further conflated the two concepts, ostensibly leaving the
reliability of testimony their shared and singular goal. But Robins
ensures that, at least in Pennsylvania, the Confrontation Clause
retains both procedural and substantive aspects.274 In other
words, the right to confront an adverse witness, to cross-examine
him or her robustly, remains inextricably intertwined with juris-
prudential notions of fair process, a procedural right to be contra-
vened only under extreme circumstances, such as witness un-
availability or statements marked with sufficient indicia of reli-
ability, where the perceived procedural harm is infinitesimally
small when compared to the greater demands of justice. What's
more, Robins also ensures that the Confrontation Clause contin-
ues to serve as a substantive right, a conduit for testimonial credi-
bility, a threshold of reliability through which testimony must
pass in order to become viable. And even though considerable
overlap between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay evidence
still exists, Robins suggests that the substance of the testimony,
its possible veracity, though important, is not dispositive, for it
remains the province of adversarial procedure to determine the
validity of inculpatory statements proffered by a non-testifying
coconspirator. '
274. See Blumenthal, Jeremy, Reading the Text of the Confrontation Clause: "To Be" or
not "To Be"?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L, 722, 729-34 (2001). Although Blumenthal does not nec-
essarily agree that such a bifurcated explication of the Confrontation Clause is historically
valid, he does recognize that such an understanding has predominated in American juris-
prudence. Id.
275. The effects of recognizing this Robins dichotomy are far-reaching, given the differ-
ent standards of appellate review for evidentiary questions and constitutional questions.
By keeping the two hemispheres separate and distinct, a defendant can better preserve his
appellate rights, since Confrontation Clause issues, as issues of law, permit a broader,
plenary review upon appeal.
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Beyond recognizing an important dichotomy between the Con-
frontation Clause and hearsay evidentiary rules, Robins also reaf-
firms a fundamental aspect of federalism, namely, that state
courts retain control over determining what is and what is not a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay evidence rule. In particu-
lar, Justice Cappy made clear that statements against penal in-
terest are not sufficiently ensconced within the ambit of a recog-
nized exception to the hearsay evidence rule to circumvent the
prophylactic dictates of the Confrontation Clause. As such, dis-
qualified from hearsay protection, statements against penal inter-
est made by a non-testifying witness must therefore conform to
the procedural and substantive demands of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. Failure to do so renders them invalid, frustrating
their admission at trial. Whether this forever remains purely
within the purview of state jurisprudence is, of course, unknow-
able,2"6 but for now at least there remains an important distinction
between the scope of firmly rooted hearsay evidence, a federal
question, and precisely what constitutes firm rooting, a state
question.
Robins also appears to foreclose a continued expansion of
Bruton-type redactions, squarely limiting such redactions to the
confines of a joint trial.277 In short, while eliding all potentially in-
culpatory references to a codefendant, whether direct or indirect,
may suffice in the context of a joint trial, such erasures do not ef-
fectuate adequate protection in a trial against a single defendant.
In a case against a single defendant, a non-testifying co-
conspirator's redacted statements present two important and in-
terrelated problems. First, the admission of such statements con-
travenes the Confrontation Clause's purported protection against
collateral prejudice. Where there is only one defendant on trial,
the very fact that the statement is admitted unduly prejudices the
defendant, since the defendant necessarily serves as the only logi-
cal foil against which the evidence can rebound. Second, the trial
276. Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d 514, 523 (Pa. 2002). Any uncertainty in this
area stems from the United States Supreme Court's fractured opinion in Lilly v. Virginia.
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist left open the possibility that certain inculpa-
tory custodial statements might qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Lilly, 527
U.S. at 147-48 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
277. Regarding this point, Justice Cappy stated: "[Robins] is not concerned with the
effectiveness of limiting instructions and the prevention of spillover prejudice to a defen-
dant when his codefendant's confession is admitted against the codefendant at a joint trial."
Robins, 812 A.2d at 521 (emphasis added).
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of a single defendant perforcely throws the against penal interest
nature of a non-testifying co-conspirator's statements into ques-
tion, because in such a setting the against penal aspect of the
statements vanishes, since the statement is no longer against the
declarant's penal interest; rather, the inculpatory statements be-
come substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. And as sub-
stantive trial evidence, such statements must circumnavigate the
Confrontation Clause's preference for adversarial testing to be
valid. An alternative ruling would potentially open up a prover-
bial Pandora's Box of accomplice testimony, allowing for myriad
abuses. Without some reasonable limitations on the admission of
a non-testifying coconspirator's statements, a defendant lies pros-
trate before the court, a potential target for any begrudged ac-
cuser. Accordingly, the only protection against abuse is the prose-
cution's ethical duty to ferret out specious, vindictive, and uncor-
roborated claims inculpating the accused. And although in many,
if not most, instances this might suffice, the majority's ruling in
Robins demonstrates a clear preference for the alternative safe-
guards afforded by the Confrontation Clause. For, as the holding
in Robins suggests, it is ultimately the Constitution, and not the
State, which instantiates certain fundamental rights meant to
curb such potential abuse.
To this extent, then, Robins appears to place real obstacles in
the path of the prosecution's use of co-conspirator testimony. Af-
ter Robins, the mere fact that an accomplice's own statements, or
confession, either directly or indirectly implicate a co-conspirator
is certainly not enough. As the Robins' court found, the manner in
which such a confession or declaration is obtained, as well as the
characteristics and context of the statement itself, are crucial to
its potential use at trial. And in determining that the admission
of extrajudicial, non-custodial statements of a non-testifying co-
conspirator contravenes the Confrontation Clause, the majority
emphasized the need for prosecutors to take some prophylactic
steps in advance to ensure that potential testimonial evidence sat-
isfies the enlivened strictures of the Sixth Amendment. Just how
prosecutors might refashion their approach to accomplice-
declarants is yet to be determined. But at a minimum, Robins
suggests that prosecutors should pay close attention to whether
the accomplice-declarant is available for trial. And if he or she is
not, prosecutors should take steps either to alleviate such un-
availability, perhaps through immunity agreement or the like, or
adumbrate before the court as to why an accomplice-declarant,
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whose testimony is integral to the state's case, is unavailable to
testify at trial. Short of this, the Sixth Amendment, at least in
Pennsylvania, will stand as an insurmountable obstacle to the
admission of such untested testimony.
David H. Cook

